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Abstract
The paper first shows that financial market equilibria need not to exist if agents possess cumulative
prospect theory preferences with piecewise-power value functions. This is due to the boundary behavior
of the cumulative prospect theory value function, which might cause an infinite short-selling problem.
But even when a nonnegativity constraint on final wealth is added, non-existence can occur due to the
non-convexity of CPT preferences, which might cause discontinuities in the agents' demand functions.
This latter observation also implies that concavification arguments which has been used in portfolio
allocation problems with CPT preferences do not apply to our general equilibrium setting with finite
many agents. Existence of equilibria is established when non-negativity constraints on final wealth are
imposed and there is a continuum of agents in the market. However, if the original prospect theory is
used instead of cumulative prospect theory, then other discontinuity problems can cause non-existence
of market equilibria even in this case. 
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Abstract
The paper first shows that financial market equilibria need not to exist if agents possess
cumulative prospect theory preferences with piecewise-power value functions. This is due to
the boundary behavior of the cumulative prospect theory value function, which might cause
an infinite short-selling problem. But even when a nonnegativity constraint on final wealth
is added, non-existence can occur due to the non-convexity of CPT preferences, which might
cause discontinuities in the agents’ demand functions. This latter observation also implies
that concavification arguments which has been used in portfolio allocation problems with CPT
preferences do not apply to our general equilibrium setting with finite many agents. Existence
of equilibria is established when non-negativity constraints on final wealth are imposed and
there is a continuum of agents in the market. However, if the original prospect theory is
used instead of cumulative prospect theory, then other discontinuity problems can cause non-
existence of market equilibria even in this case.
Keywords: Cumulative prospect theory, prospect theory, general equilibrium model, non-
convex preferences, continuum of agents.
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1 Introduction
The general equilibrium model provides the foundation to most of the theoretical and empirical
developments in asset pricing. For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe
(1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) is a specific general equilibrium model (see, for example,
Hens and Pilgrim 2003) that can be considered “one of the two or three major contributions of
academic research to financial managers during the post-war era” (Jagannathan and Wang 1996).
Asset pricing models in finance usually make specific assumptions on agents’ preferences.
Expected utility preferences with constant relative or absolute risk aversion are the classical
paradigm. And under these assumptions, agents’ preferences are convex and the conditions for
existence and uniqueness of financial market equilibria can be determined (see Hens and Pilgrim
2003, Magill and Quinzii 1996 for an overview). Without convexity, financial market equilibria
might not exist if there is a finite number of agents. However, financial markets with a large
number of agents where each of them has an insignificant impact on trading, can be modeled
by a continuum of agents. Under the assumption of a continuum of agents, market equilibria
exist under less restrictive conditions on agents’ preferences (Aumann 1966, Schmeidler 1969,
Hildenbrand 1974, Yamazaki 1978).
The prospect theory (PT) of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the cumulative prospect the-
ory (CPT) of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) summarize several violations of the expected utility
theory as observed in laboratory experiments. In (cumulative) prospect theory, utility is defined
over gains and losses relative to a reference point and decision makers have different risk prefer-
ences over gains and losses with a convex-concave value function. Moreover, (cumulative) prospect
theory introduces a probability weighting function to describe decision makers’ preferences, i.e.,
it is assumed that decision makers do not evaluate outcomes according to the true probabilities,
but according to decision weights. The probability weighting function plays an important role in
(cumulative) prospect theory. For example, it is not true that in (cumulative) prospect theory
risk attitudes are only determined by the value function. Convex preferences can arise even if
the value function is non-concave. Consequently, it is not clear whether the existence of financial
equilibria can be established under general conditions when agents possess CPT preferences.
This paper shows that in a general equilibrium model with a finite number of agents financial
market equilibria need not exist if agents possess (heterogenous) CPT preferences. Due to the
boundary behavior of the CPT value function, if agents do not face non-negativity constraints
on final wealth, non-existence of equilibria is obtained when agents possess heterogenous CPT
preferences. In this case, it might occur that for any set of prices, at least one agent optimally
infinitely short-sells one of the assets. This happens if we apply the classical specification of CPT
using a piecewise-power value function. As a consequence, market demand is infinite for at least
one of the assets, for which the market clearing condition will never be satisfied and, therefore,
a financial market equilibrium does not exist. A similar result is shown by De Giorgi, Hens, and
Levy (2003), who use a different setup and impose restrictive assumptions on assets’ returns. Note
that in general unbounded consumption sets are not sufficient for nonexistence of equilibria, as
shown by Werner (1987) and, more recently, by Alloucha, Le Vanb, and Page (2006). The infinite
short-selling problem has also been identified by Jin and Zhou (2008), who in a continuous time
setting derive the conditions under which the portfolio selection model with cumulative prospect
theory is “well-posed”, i.e., the optimal feasible portfolio has finite prospective value. Jin and
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Zhou (2008) make use of probability weighting to solve the infinite short-selling problem but they
don’t study financial market equilibria.
In order to avoid infinite short-selling we impose non-negativity constraints on final wealth.
However, we show that, while non-negativity constraints on final wealth solve the infinite short-
selling problem, non-existence of equilibria still arises. This result is not an obvious consequence
of the fact that CPT assumes a convex value function over the domain of losses. Indeed, as
we discussed above, probability weighting also enters into the specification of CPT preferences,
and it can mitigate the effect of the convex value function. This happens, e.g., in portfolio
selection problems as demonstrated by Jin and Zhou (2008), where concavification arguments are
used to find optimal asset allocations. However, in our general equilibrium setting, concavification
arguments do not apply and CPT preferences appear to be non-convex. This causes discontinuities
in the assets’ demand function, which also happen if agents have homogeneous CPT preferences.
Recently, Xi (2007) has proved the existence of financial market equilibria if agents possess
S-shaped value functions. Apparently, this finding contrasts with our examples of non-existence.
However, in Xi (2007) existence is obtained only under the condition that discounted portfolio
payoffs are strictly larger than the initial wealth, which is taken as reference point. Under this
assumption agents never face losses and thus only the concave part of their value function deter-
mines the aggregate assets’ demand. This is the classical case of expected utility preferences with
a concave utility function. Therefore, our examples of non-existence (which consider the most
relevant case where both gains and losses occur with strictly positive probability) shows that no
general existence results can be obtained if the number of agents is finite.
In order to deal with the non-existence of equilibria due to the non-convexity of CPT prefer-
ences we assume that there is a continuum of agents participating in the financial market. We
show that CPT preferences satisfy the conditions for existence of equilibria as established by
Aumann (1966) and later generalized by Hildenbrand (1974), even when considering probability
weighting. By contrast, these conditions are generally violated with PT preferences and existence
of financial market equilibria cannot be established in this case even in the presence of a con-
tinuum of agents. The reason for this surprising discrepancy between the two models lies in the
continuity properties that CPT satisfies, but PT does not. Since PT and CPT only differ by how
probability weighting is modeled, this result further demonstrates the importance of probability
weighting for the specification of agents’ preferences.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model setup.
In Section 3 we discuss two examples of financial markets with a finite number of agents with
cumulative prospect theory preferences where financial market equilibria do not exist. Section 4
shows that financial market equilibria exist if non-negativity constraints are imposed and there
is a continuum of agents. We also provide an example with a continuum of agents and prospect
theory preferences, where a financial market equilibrium does not exits. Section 5 concludes.
Except for the main theorem in Section 4, all the proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a static investment model: in t = 0 agents decide their investment strategies, while
in t = 1 they consume their total portfolio’s payoff and endowment. Uncertainty is given by a
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finite probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω = {1, . . . , S}, F = 2|Ω| is the set of all subsets of Ω,
and P [{s}] = ps > 0 is the probability that the state of the nature s appears. There are J + 1
securities with payoff A0,s, . . . , AJ,s in state s. These can be traded without restrictions, i.e., the
marketed subspace corresponds to X = {∑Jj=0 θj Aj |θj ∈ R, ∀j = 0, . . . , J} ⊆ RS . For sake of
simplicity, we impose the following assumptions on payoffs Aj,s:
Assumption 2.1. (i) Aj,s ≥ 0 for all j and all s,
(ii) for all j = 0, . . . , J there exists a state of nature s such that Aj,s > 0,
(iii) for all s ∈ Ω there exists at least one asset j with Aj,s > 0.
Let qj be an arbitrage-free price for security j. Under Assumption 2.1, we have qj > 0. We
thus define asset j’s gross return in state s by Rj,s = Aj,s/qj .
The set of agents in the economy is denoted by I, where #I ≥ 2, i.e., there are at least two
traders in the economy. The set I might contain finite or infinite many elements. Each trader
i ∈ I is initially endowed with θi0j > 0 units of asset j, j = 0, . . . , J , and receives endowments
wis ≥ 0, s ∈ Ω at time t = 1. The initial wealth corresponds to wi0(q) =
∑J
j=0 θ
i
0j qj > 0 and
depends on prices q = (q0, . . . , qJ)′. Each agent in the economy evaluates investment opportunities
X ∈ X in terms of a cumulative prospect theory utility function on final wealth (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992), i.e., there exist a value function vi : R → R, decision weights piis : RS → [0, 1]
for s = 1, . . . , S and a reference point RP i ∈ R such that agent i’s utility is given by:
(1) V i(X) =
S∑
s=1
vi(Xs + wis −RP i)piis(X) for all X ∈ X .
and vi and piis satisfy the following assumption:
Assumption 2.2. (i) vi is a two-times differentiable function on R \ {0}, strictly increasing
on R, concave on (0,∞) and convex on (−∞, 0).
(ii) For X ∈ X , piis(X) is given as follows:
piis(X) =

pii,−
(
P
[
X + wi ≤ Xs + wis
])− pii,− (P [X + wi < Xs + wis]) if Π−1(1) < s ≤ Π−1(s′),
pii,− (ps) if Π(s) = 1,
pii,+
(
P
[
X + wi ≥ Xs + wis
])− pii,+ (P [X + w > Xs + wis]) if Π−1(S) > s > Π−1(s′),
pii,+ (ps) if Π(s) = S,
where Π : Ω → {1, . . . , S} is a permutation of the states of nature such that XΠ−1(1) +
wiΠ−1(1) ≤ · · · ≤ XΠ−1(s′) + wiΠ−1(s′) < RP i ≤ XΠ−1(s′+1) + wiΠ−1(s′+1) ≤ · · · ≤ XΠ−1(S) +
wiΠ−1(S) and pi
i,+ and pii,− are continuously differentiable, non-decreasing functions from
[0,1] onto [0,1] with pii,±(p) = p for p = 0 and p = 1. Moreover, we find pi,+, pi,− ∈ [0, 1]
such that pii,± are concave on (0, pi,±) and convex on (pi,±, 1).
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We point out that decision weights piis(X) do not depend on the choice of the permutation Π.
We call a payoff Xs + wis < RP
i a loss and a payoff Xs + wis > RP
i a gain, while RP i is the
neutral reference point. The reference point RP i can also depend on prices q at time t = 0. For
sake of notational simplicity, we don’t make it explicit here that RP i can also depend on q. In
Section 3 we’ll assume for RP i a very specific form and there it will clear that it also depends on
prices q.
We report here two useful properties of the value function V i:
Lemma 2.1. Under Assumption 2.2, V i satisfies the following properties:
(i) V i is monotone, i.e., for X,Y ∈ X , X ≥ Y , it follows V i(X) ≥ V i(Y ). The inequality is
strict if there exists a state of nature s ∈ Ω such that X(s) > Y (s).
(ii) V i is weak-? continuous, i.e., for any sequence of probability measures {pn} with uniformly
bounded support that converges weakly-? to a probability measure p, we have V i(Xn) →
V i(X) where P
[
Xn + wi ≤ x
]
=
∫ x
∞ dpn and P
[
X + wi ≤ x] = ∫ x−∞ dp.1
Before we proceed with the presentation of the model, we derive from Lemma 2.1 (ii) the
following corollary, which will be very useful in Section 4.
Corollary 2.1. For every θ˜ ∈ RJ+1, the sets
{θ ∈ RJ+1 | V i(Xθ)− V i(Xθ˜) > 0}(2)
{θ ∈ RJ+1 | V i(Xθ)− V i(Xθ˜) < 0}(3)
are open, where Xθ =
∑J
j=0 θj Aj.
To be as close as possible to the original specification of CPT suggested by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), we additionally assume that
Assumption 2.3.
(4) vi(x) =
{
xα
i
, x > 0,
−βi (−x)αi , x ≤ 0 .
where βi ≥ 1 and αi ∈ (0, 1] and
(5) pii,±(p) =
pγ
i(
pγi + (1− p)γi)1/γi
for γi ∈ (γmin, 1], γmin > 0.2
1The sequence of probability measures {pn} is said to converge weakly-? to a probability measure p if and only
if
∫
f(x) dpn(x)→
∫
f(x) dp(x) for all continuous and bounded functions f .
2The parameter γmin is the minimal value for γ
i such that the functions pii,± are increasing on [0, 1] and thus
satisfy Assumption 2.2 (ii). Ingersoll (2008) found γmin = 0.279.
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In many applications in finance of cumulative prospect theory, Assumption 2.3 is usually
imposed (see, among others, Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001, Benartzi and Thaler 1995). We
will thus refer to it in the remainder of the paper.
Later we will also discuss the case where agents possess preferences according to the original
prospect theory (PT) of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). We thus provide a formal definition
of prospect theory preferences. Agent i evaluates investment opportunities X ∈ X in terms of
prospect theory if there exist a value function v¯i : R → R, decision weights p¯iis : X → [0, 1] for
s = 1, . . . , S and a reference point R¯P i ∈ R such that agent i’s utility is given by:
(6) V¯ i(X) =
S∑
s=1
v¯i(Xs + wis − R¯P i) p¯iis(X) for all X ∈ X ,
and v¯i and p¯iis satisfy the following assumption:
Assumption 2.4. (i) v¯i is a two-times differentiable function on R \ {0}, strictly increasing
on R, concave on (0,∞) and convex on (−∞, 0).
(ii) For X ∈ X , p¯iis(X) is given as follows:
p¯iis(X) =
{
p¯ii,− (ps) if Π−1(1) ≤ s ≤ Π−1(s′),
p¯ii,+ (ps) if Π−1(S) ≥ s > Π−1(s′),
where Π : Ω → {1, . . . , S} is a permutation of the states of nature such that XΠ−1(1) +
wiΠ−1(1) ≤ · · · ≤ XΠ−1(s′) + wiΠ−1(s′) < RP i ≤ XΠ−1(s′+1) + wiΠ−1(s′+1) ≤ · · · ≤ XΠ−1(S) +
wiΠ−1(S) and p¯i
i,+ and p¯ii,− are continuously differentiable, non-decreasing functions from
[0,1] onto [0,1] with pii,±(p) = p for p = 0 and p = 1. Moreover, we find pi,+, pi,− ∈ [0, 1]
such that p¯ii,± are concave on (0, pi,±) and convex on (pi,±, 1).
It is clear from Equations (1) and (6), and Assumptions 2.2 and 2.4, that cumulative prospect
theory and prospect theory coincide when S = 2 and X ∈ X and wi are such that both gains and
losses can occur with strictly positive probability.
The individual portfolio choice problem with cumulative prospect theory preferences is
(7) max
θ∈RJ+1
V i
 J∑
j=0
θj Aj
 , J∑
j=0
θj qj ≤ wi0(q).
A financial market equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Financial market equilibrium). A vector of prices q = (q0, . . . , qJ)′ ∈ RJ+1+ and
agents’ portfolios θ1, . . . , θI ∈ RJ+1 define a financial market equilibrium if
θi = arg max
θ∈RJ+1
V i
 J∑
j=0
θj Aj
 , J∑
j=0
θj qj ≤
J∑
j=0
θi0j qj
for all i ∈ I, and the market clears, i.e., ∑i∈I θij = ∑i∈I θi0j for all j = 0, . . . , J .
At any financial market equilibrium agents optimally allocate their resources. Assets’ demand
and supply coincide.
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3 Non-existence of equilibria
In this section we show that financial market equilibria might not exist if there is a finite number
of agents who possess preferences according to cumulative prospect theory, and the value function
corresponds to the standard specification given by the piecewise-power function suggested by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). We show that non-existence of equilibria might be due to: (i)
the boundary behavior of the CPT value function (Subsection 3.2), and (ii) non-convexity of
CPT preferences (Subsection 3.3). We point out that the non-existence of equilibria due to non-
convexity implies that in the general equilibrium model studied in this section the probability
weighting function in CPT does not mitigate the effect of the convex-concave value function.
This is in contrast to portfolio optimization problems as studied in Jin and Zhou (2008), where
probability weighting allows to concavify the CPT objective function, leading in this way to
existence of a unique optimal allocation.
In this section we additionally make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.1.
(i) There exists a risk-free asset with payoff A0 > 0.
(ii) The reference point corresponds to RP i = R0wi0(q) for all agents i, where R0 ∈ R+ is the
risk-free gross return.3
With some abuse of notation we write A0,s = A0 for all s and A0 > 0 is treated as a strictly
positive real number. Assumption 2.2 (i) (vi is strictly increasing) and Assumption 3.1 (i) (exis-
tence of a risk-free asset) imply that optimal strategies θ solving Problem (7) satisfy
∑J
j=0 θj qj =∑J
j=0 θ
i
0j qj . We thus rewrite portfolio gains and losses using wealth shares λ
i
j = θ
i
j qj/w
i
0(q) and
λˆij = λ
i
j/(1− λi0):
Xθ,s −RP i = wi0(q)
J∑
j=0
λij Rj,s −R0wi0(q) = (1− λi0)wi0(q)
 J∑
j=1
λˆij Rj,s −R0
 .(8)
where Xθ,s =
∑J
j=0 θ
i
j Aj,s.
For sake of simplicity, in the examples reported in this section we will assume without loss of
generality that wi0(q) does not depend on prices q. We thus write w
i
0 instead of w
i
0(q). In our first
counter-example, traders’ strategies do not depend on initial wealth, due to the piecewise-power
function and the assumption that endowment at time t = 1 is zero. In the second counter-
example, strategies only depend on the ratio between endowment at time t = 1 and initial wealth.
Therefore, we can easily generalize our second counter-example to the case where initial wealth
depends on prices, assuming that endowment at t = 1 is a state-dependent proportion of initial
wealth.
3The results of this section do not depend on the assumption that the reference point corresponds to the risk-free
gross return. However, this assumption strongly simplifies the derivation of optimal strategies.
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3.1 One risky asset
We restrict ourselves to a simple setup where only one risky asset and two states of nature exist:
Assumption 3.2. (i) J = 1, i.e., there are only two assets.
(ii) S = 2, i.e., there are only two states of nature.
Under Assumption 3.2 (i), agent i’s strategy is fully characterized by the proportion of initial
wealth λi0 placed on the risk-free asset (i.e, λˆ
i
1 = 1 in Equation (8)).
Moreover, under Assumption 3.2, we can re-parameterize assets’ gross returns and prices in
order to simplify the analysis. Let A1,1 > 0 and ζ = A1,2/A1,1; this is fixed and independent from
prices q0, q1. Without loss of generality we assume that ζ ∈ [0, 1), i.e., the payoff in state 1 is
strictly larger than the payoff in state 2. From our assumptions on payoffs Aj (see Assumption 2.1),
it follows that qj > 0 for j = 0, 1. Moreover, from A1,1 > A1,2 we have R1,1 > R1,2. Finally, since
q0, q1 are arbitrage-free prices we have
R1,1 > R0
(
⇔ q1
q0
<
A1,1
A0
)
(9)
R1,2 < R0
(
⇔ q1
q0
>
A1,2
A0
)
.(10)
Note that the market we just described is complete, thus our examples of non-existence of equi-
libria will be in a complete market setting. Moreover, Equations (9) and (10), as well as As-
sumption 3.1 (ii), imply that any risky strategy will generate both gains and losses with strictly
positive probability. Given that S = 2, it follows that in the setting of this section cumulative
prospect theory and prospect theory coincide when wis = 0 for all s.
4
Let ξ = log ((R1,1 −R0)/(R0 −R1,2)) ∈ R be the log-ratio of the absolute excess returns. This
is well defined given Equations (9) and (10). From the definition of R0 ∈ R+ we have
q0 =
A0
R0
.
Moreover,
q1 = A1,1
(
R0
1 + eξ
1 + ζ eξ
)−1
.
Thus assets’ prices are fully characterized by R0 ∈ R+ and ξ ∈ R. Using this parametrization we
also obtain:
R1,1 = R0
1 + eξ
1 + ζ eξ
R1,2 = ζ R0
1 + eξ
1 + ζ eξ
.
4If wis > 0 for some s, it might occur that only gains appears. In this case, PT and CPT do not coincide.
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3.2 The infinite short-selling problem
We first assume that agents do not face non-negativity constraints for their final wealth and do not
receive any endowment at time t = 1, i.e., wis = 0 for all i ∈ I and s ∈ Ω.5 This latter assumption
will be relaxed in Subsection 3.3. We provide an example of an economy with heterogenous
cumulative prospect theory agents with piecewise-power utility functions, where for any vector
of prices some agents may want to take an infinite position in the risky asset or in the risk-free
asset, and thus a financial market equilibrium will not exist.
Since only one risky asset exists and wis = 0 for all s, using Equation (8), the value function
of Equation (1) can be written as a function of the strategy λ0:
V˜ i(λ0) =
2∑
s=1
piis v
i
[
wi0 (R1,s −R0) (1− λ0)
]
,
i.e.,
(11) V˜ i(λ0) = (wi0)
αi ,

(1− λ0)αi
[
pii1 (R1,1 −R0)α
i − pii2 βi (R0 −R1,2)α
i
]
, λ0 < 1
0, λ0 = 1
(λ0 − 1)αi
[
pii2 (R0 −R1,2)α
i − pii1 βi (R1,1 −R0)α
i
]
, λ0 > 1
.
The three cases λ0 < 1, λ0 = 1 and λ0 > 1 correspond to when state 1 delivers a gain and state
2 a loss, both states deliver the reference point, and state 1 delivers a loss and state 2 a gain,
respectively. Note that we simplified the notation and wrote piis instead of pi
i
s(X). Since we only
have one gain and one loss, this should not cause any confusion. If state s delivers a gain (loss),
then piis simply corresponds to pi
i,+(ps) (pii,−(ps)).
Each agent solves:
max
λ0
V˜ i(λ0).
It is easily seen that λ0 = 1 is optimal when pii1 (R1,1 − R0)α
i − pii2 βi (R0 − R1,2)α
i
< 0 and
pii2 (R0−R1,2)α
i−pii1 βi (R1,1−R0)α
i
< 0. By contrast, when pii1 (R1,1−R0)α
i−pii2 βi (R0−R1,2)α
i
>
0 (or pii2 (R0 −R1,2)α
i − pii1 βi (R1,1 −R0)α
i
> 0), then λ0 = −∞ (or λ0 =∞) is optimal. Finally,
when pii1 (R1,1 − R0)α
i − pii2 βi (R0 − R1,2)α
i
= 0 (or pii2 (R0 − R1,2)α
i − pii1 βi (R1,1 − R0)α
i
= 0),
then any λ0 ≤ 1 (or any λ ≥ 1) is optimal.
The condition
pii1 (R1,1 −R0)α
i − pii2 βi (R0 −R1,2)α
i
= 0
is equivalent to
ξ =
1
αi
log
(
pii2
pii1
βi
)
5This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that the endowment at time 1 is deterministic for all traders, i.e.,
does not dependent on the state of nature s, and the reference point RP i from Assumption 3.1 (i) is replaced by
wis + w
i
0(q)R0. Indeed, in this case gains and losses are identical to the case where w
i
s = 0 for all s and i and the
reference point RP i satisfies Assumption 3.1 (i). Since preferences as specified in Equation (1) only depend on gains
and losses, the equilibrium implications of wi deterministic and the reference point wis + w
i
0(q)R0 are identical to
the case studied in this subsection.
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and the condition
pii2 (R0 −R1,2)α
i − pii1 βi (R1,1 −R0)α
i
= 0
is equivalent to
ξ = − 1
αi
log
(
pii1
pii2
βi
)
.
Therefore, using
ωiu =
1
αi
log
(
βi
pii2
pii1
)
and
ωid = −
1
αi
log
(
βi
pii1
pii2
)
we can write the optimal strategy as follows
λi,opt0 =

∞ ξ < ωid,
any λi0 ≥ 1 ξ = ωid,
1 ξ ∈ (ωid, ωiu)
any λi0 ≤ 1 ξ = ωiu,
−∞ ξ > ωiu.
.
Note that the optimal strategy λi,opt0 does not depend on initial wealth w
i
0. Moreover, it also
doesn’t depend on the equilibrium risk-free gross return R0. When ωid = ω
i
u and ξ = ω
i
d than any
strategy λ0 ∈ R is optimal for agent i. For ξ /∈ [ωid, ωiu], agent i’s optimal strategy is to infinitely
short-sell.
For prices ξ ∈ {ωid, ωiu} the optimal strategy is not unique. For example, for ξ = ωiu, the
trader is indifferent between investing all her wealth in the risk-free asset, in the risky asset, or
investing any positive amount in the risky asset and the remaining wealth in the risk-free asset.
In our example, this result is due to the choice of the reference point and the assumption that
endowment at time 1 is zero. However, the same strategy would also follow under more general
assumptions on time 1 endowment (see, for example, footnote 8), the probability state-space and
the number of assets available. We point that our choice of the reference point (Assumption 3.1
(i)) is common to many applications of CPT in finance and thus the non-uniqueness of traders’
optimal strategies is a typical observation.6
Optimal strategies are not robust with respect to the agent’s preferences if we fix assets’ prices
ξ and R0. Let ξ = ωiu −  fixed, where  > 0. Then if we slightly change the parameter βi or αi
such that ωiu decreases to ω˜
i
u < ω
i
u −  = ξ, then agent i’s optimal choice jumps from placing her
entire wealth on the risk-free asset to an infinite short-selling of the risky asset.
If agents have homogeneous preferences, then all prices
{
(ξ,R0)|ξ = ωju, R0 ∈ R+
}
are equi-
librium prices, where j ∈ I. Note that in case of homogenous preferences, ωiu and ωid are identical
6Barberis and Huang (2008), in a model with homogenous preferences, use the condition ξ = ωu to characterize
equilibrium prices. Due to the non-uniqueness of optimal investment strategies at equilibrium, they call it an
equilibrium with homogenous preferences and “heterogenous portfolio holdings.”
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for all traders. On possible equilibrium allocation is that all agents except one only buy the risk-
free asset and one agent clears the market. Consequently, in this case, any price q0 > 0 for the
risk-free asset is supported at equilibrium. However, the existence of equilibria is not guaranteed
if agents have heterogenous preferences. Indeed, if for all prices (ξ,R0) ∈ R × R+ at least one
agent wants to infinitely leverage the risky asset or the risk-free asset, then no financial market
equilibrium exists.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.2, and additionally, wis = 0 for all i ∈ I,
s ∈ Ω, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) No financial market equilibrium exists;
(ii)
⋂
i∈I [ω
i
d, ω
i
u] = ∅.7
where ωid = −(1/αi) log
(
βi pii1/pi
i
2
)
and ωiu = (1/α
i) log
(
βi pii2/pi
i
1
)
.
In the following example with heterogeneous agents, condition (ii) in the lemma is satisfied,
thus no financial market equilibrium exists.
Example 3.1. Only two agents exist, #I = 2. Let p1 = 0.99 and p2 = 0.01 be the probabili-
ties of the good and the bad state, respectively. The two agents have cumulative prospect theory
preferences with the piecewise-power value function of Equation (4) and the weighting function of
Equation (5). The parameters specifications are reported in Table 1. Agent 1’s parameters cor-
respond to the calibration of CPT given by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), while agent 2 is risk
neutral (α2 = 1), use objective probabilities (γ2 = 1) and, does not dislike losses more than gains
(β2 = 1). The bounds ωiu and ω
i
d are also reported in Table 1; we have: [ω
1
d, ω
1
u] ∩ [ω2d, ω2u] = ∅.
Consequently, for all ξ and R0 > 0 there exists at least one agent who optimally takes an infinite
long or short position on the risky asset and no financial market equilibrium exists.
[Table 1 about here.]
Note that in Example 3.1 we have two traders, both with CPT preferences, one is the average
decision maker described by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), while the second one is a risk neutral
expected utility maximizer, a special case of CPT that also satisfies expected utility theory.
If
⋂
i∈I [ω
i
d, ω
i
u] 6= ∅ then any pair (ωju, R0), R0 ∈ R+, is a financial market equilibrium, where
ωju = mini=1,...,J ωiu. Indeed, the upper bound of agent j satisfies ω
j
u ∈ [ωid, ωiu] for all i ∈ I and,
therefore, any agent i is optimal with the strategy λi,opt0 = 1 for i 6= j, while agent j is optimal
with any strategy λj0 ≤ 1 which clears the market.
Lemma 3.1 also implies that price-independent constraints on λ0 (e.g., bounds λ0 ≥ 0 and
λ0 ≤ 1) are sufficient to establish existence of equilibria when condition (ii) in the lemma is
verified. For example, in the case of price-independent lower bounds on λ0, prices {(ξ,R0)|ξ =
maxi∈I ωiu, R0 ∈ R+} are equilibrium prices where all agents but one are forced to take the lower
bound on λ0, and the agent with ω
j
u = ξ clears the market. However, with equilibrium prices
of this type agents’ strategies are mainly determined by the constraint on λ0, thus agents are
not free to choose their investment strategy. In order to avoid this kind of equilibrium prices,
7 If ωid = ω
i
u, then [ω
i
d, ω
i
u] = {ωiu}.
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in Subsection 3.3 we deal with infinite short-selling by introducing non-negativity constraints on
final wealth, which implies price-dependent lower bound on investment strategies. We will show
that in this case financial market equilibria need not to exist.
3.3 Discontinuity of the demand function
Subsection 3.2 shows that a financial market equilibrium might not exist as a consequence of
the infinite short-selling problem that arises when agents have heterogenous cumulative prospect
theory preferences and piecewise-power utility functions. In this subsection we impose lower
bounds for consumption, so that infinite short-selling cannot be implemented. However, we show
that also with lower bounds for consumption, a financial market equilibrium might not exist since
agents’ strategies and aggregate assets’ demand are not continuous functions of prices. This result
also holds if agents’ preferences are homogenous.
In addition to our main setup, we assume that the agent’s final wealth must satisfy the
following non-negativity constraint
Assumption 3.3.
(12) Xiθ,s + w
i
s ≥ 0
for all s = 1, 2 where Xiθ,s is the portfolio’s payoff of trader i in state s.
From Equation (12) we derive the constraints for the portfolio strategy λ0:
λ0 ≤ 1 +
(
wi1
wi0
+R0
)
1
R1,1 −R0 = 1 +
(
wi1
wi0
+R0
)
1
R0
1 + ζ eξ
eξ (1− ζ) = λ
i,max
0 ,(13)
λ0 ≥ 1−
(
wi2
wi0
+R0
)
1
R0 −R1,2 = 1−
(
wi2
wi0
+R0
)
1
R0
1 + ζ eξ
1− ζ = λ
i,min
0 .(14)
The objective function V i(Xs) =
∑S
s=1 v
i(Xs +wis−RP i)piis, written as function of λ0, becomes:
(15)
V˜ i(λ0) =
pii1
(
(1− λ0) (R1,1 −R0)wi0 + wi1
)αi − pii2 βi ((1− λ0) (R0 −R1,2)wi0 − wi2)αi , λ0 ≤ λi,d0
pii1
(
(1− λ0) (R1,1 −R0)wi0 + wi1
)αi + pii2 ((1− λ0) (R1,2 −R0)wi0 + wi2)αi , λ0 ∈ (λi,d0 , λi,u0 )
−pii1 βi
(
(λ0 − 1) (R1,1 −R0)wi0 − wi1
)αi + pii2 ((λ0 − 1)) (R0 −R1,2)wi0 + wi2)αi , λ0 ≥ λi,u0
where
λi,u0 = 1 +
wi1
wi0
1
R1,1 −R0 = 1 +
wi1
wi0
1
R0
1 + ζ eξ
eξ (1− ζ) ,(16)
λi,d0 = 1−
wi2
wi0
1
R0 −R1,2 = 1−
wi2
wi0
1
R0
1 + ζ eξ
1− ζ .(17)
The three cases λ0 ≤ λi,d0 , λ0 ∈ (λi,d0 , λi,u0 ) and λ0 ≥ λi,u0 for V˜ i(λ0) correspond to when state 1
delivers a loss (with respect to reference point) and state 2 a gain, both states deliver gains, and
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state 1 delivers a loss and state 2 a gain, respectively. When both states deliver gains, V˜ i(λ0) is
a concave function of λ0. In the other cases it is convex.
The following lemma reports agents’ optimal choices as a function of ξ and R0. We restrict
ourselves to the case αi ∈ (0, 1) and wi1 + wi2 > 0.
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, with additionally, αi ∈ (0, 1) and wi1 +
wi2 > 0, the optimal strategy is:
(17) λi,opt0 =

λi,max0 if ξ < ω
i
d(R0)
λi,max0 , λ
i,∗
0 if ξ = ω
i
d(R0)
λi,∗0 if ξ ∈ (ωid(R0), ωiu(R0))
λi,min0 , λ
i,∗
0 if ξ = ω
i
u(R0)
λi,min0 if ξ > ω
i
u(R0)
where
λi,∗0 = 1−
1
R0
wi2 − ηi(ξ)wi1
wi0 (ηi(ξ) + e−ξ)
1 + ζ eξ
eξ (1− ζ) ,
ηi(ξ) =
(
pii2
pii1
e−ξ
) 1
1−αi , ωid(R0) uniquely solves V˜ (λ
i,max
0 ) = V˜ (λ
i,∗
0 ), and ω
i
u(R0) uniquely solves
V˜ (λi,min0 ) = V˜ (λ
i,∗
0 ). Moreover, λ
i,∗
0 is continuous, strictly decreasing in ξ. Finally, ω
i
d(R0) and
ωiu(R0) are continuous functions of R0. The following properties are satisfied:
(i) ωid(R0) ≤ ωid = − 1αi ln
(
pii1
pii2
βi
)
, and ωiu(R0) ≥ ωiu = 1αi ln
(
pii2 β
pii1
)
for R0 > 0;
(ii) limR0→0 ωid(R0) = −∞ and limR0→0 ωiu(R0) =∞;
(iii) limR0→∞ ωid(R0) = ω
i
d and limR0→∞ ω
i
u(R0) = ω
i
u.
The lemma shows that optimal portfolio choices are not continuous functions of the price
ξ. We point out the non-continuity of trader’s strategies is due to the convex-concave shape of
the value function in Equation (15). The objective function V˜ in Equation (15) is concave on
(λi,d0 , λ
i,u
0 ) with maximum in λ
i,?
0 , while it is convex outside this interval, with maximum in λ
i,min
0
on [λi,min0 , λ
i,d
0 ] and in λ
i,max
0 on [λ
i,u
0 , λ
i,max
0 ]. Due to the convex-concave shape of V˜ the global
maximum of V˜ jumps between the three local maxima λi,?0 , λ
i,min
0 and λ
i,max
0 , depending on prices.
We also see that differently from the example in the previous subsection where we assumed
wi1 = w
i
2 = 0, the bounds ω
i
d(R0) and ω
i
u(R0) now depend on the risk-free gross return R0. This is
due the fact that wi1 +w
i
2 is assumed to be strictly positive. Figure 1 shows the functions ωd(R0)
and ωu(R0) for an agent with α = 0.88, β = 2.25, γ = 0.61, and w0 = w1 = w2 = 1. These
functions are continuous and strictly decreasing.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The discontinuity of agents’ strategies causes the robustness problem which we already identified
in the previous subsection as stated here: for fixed prices (ξ,R0) ∈ R × R+, where ξ is in a
neighborhood of ωiu(R0) (or ω
i
d(R0)), and if we slightly change the parameters of the agent’s
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utility or weighting function, or her endowment, the optimal portfolio choice may drastically
change. This is shown in Figure 2, where the optimal investment strategy λopt0 from Equation (3.2)
is plotted as a function of the parameters α and β, for fixed prices (ξ,R0) = (wu(1), 1) where
ωu(·) corresponds to the upper bound for an agent with parameters α = 0.88 and β = 2.25.
We observe that if we slightly change α and β around the values 0.88 and 2.25, respectively, the
optimal strategy jumps from λ∗0 to λmin0 .
[Figure 2 about here.]
The discontinuity of agents’ optimal portfolio strategies imply that aggregate assets’ demand
is also a discontinuous function of prices. Consequently, it is not guaranteed that the market
clearing condition is satisfied and thus that a financial market equilibrium exists. This can be
proved analytically in the case of homogeneous preferences.
Proposition 3.1. Let I = {1, 2}. Suppose that agents possess homogeneous preferences according
to Equation (1) and Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3, with αi = α ∈ (0, 1) and w11 = w21 > 0, w12 =
w22 = 0. Moreover, suppose that the market clearing condition is
∑2
i=1 λ
i
0 = 1.
8 Then under
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, 3.3, no financial market equilibrium exists.
Also if preferences are heterogeneous, financial market equilibria might not exist, as shown in
the following example.
Example 3.2. Let #I = 2. Suppose that agents preferences and endowments are as described in
Table 2 and the market clearing condition is
∑2
i=1 λ
i
0 = 1. Then no financial market equilibrium
exists.
[Table 2 about here.]
The interval [ω2d(R0), ω
2
u(R0)] is a strict subset of the interval [ω
1
d(R0), ω
1
u(R0)] (see Figure 3).
[Figure 3 about here.]
Since w12 = w
2
2 = 0 and using a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can easily
show that the market clearing condition can only be satisfied if ξ ∈ [ω2u(R0), ω1u(R0)], λ2,opt0 =
λ2,min0 and λ
1,opt
0 = λ
1,∗
0 . In this case, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1, the market
clearing risk-free gross return corresponds to
R0(ξ) =
η1(ξ)w1
w0 (η1(ξ) + e−ξ)
1 + ζ eξ
eξ ζ (1 + eξ)
.
Thus, a financial market equilibrium exists if and only if the following condition is satisfied
ξ ∈ [ω2u(R0(ξ)), ω1u(R0(ξ))].(18)
In Figure 4, we plot the functions ω2u(R0(ξ)) and ω
2
u(R0(ξ)). The 45
◦ straight line does not
intersect the interval [ω2u(R0(ξ)), ω
1
u(R0(ξ))]. No ξ satisfies Property 18, i.e., no financial market
equilibrium exists.
[Figure 4 about here.]
8The market clearing condition
∑2
i=1 λ
i
0 = 1 corresponds to the market clearing condition
∑2
i=1(1− λi0) = 1 for
the risky asset.
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4 Existence of equilibria
We have seen that cumulative prospect theory can lead to the non-existence of a financial market
equilibrium due to the discontinuity of the demand function. There are, however, some cases
where one can establish existence. In this section we study such a case, namely the case of
markets with infinite number of agents, where each agent has negligible wealth and hence no
single agent has an influence on the market.
Such markets can be modeled by a continuum of (possibly heterogeneous) agents, an idea
that has first been introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1963) and Aumann (1964). We will show
that in such markets an equilibrium will exist for agents with CPT preferences. At the end
of this section, we will also briefly consider the case of original prospect theory which poses
some mathematical problems that can lead to non-existence even in the continuum case. This
demonstrates that probability weighting causes highly non-trivial effects that differ from classical
results in the expected utility framework.
We start with a definition of a market with a continuum of agents, which is close to that of
Aumann (1966):
Definition 4.1 (Market with a continuum of agents). The set of agents I is given by the interval
[0, 1]. A portfolio allocation of assets is an integrable function θ : [0, 1] → RJ+1. The initial
allocation of assets is described by an integrable function θ0 : [0, 1]→ RJ+1. Each agent i ∈ [0, 1]
has a preference as specified in Equation (1) and Assumption 2.2 with a piecewise-power value
function as in Equation (4).
We pose a few natural assumptions on these markets:
Assumption 4.2. We assume:
(i)
∫ 1
0 θ
i
0j di > 0 for all j = 0, . . . , J , i.e., every asset exists initially in the market.
(ii) The CPT-parameters α, β and γ are piecewise continuous functions of i with a finite number
of discontinuities. Moreover, αi ∈ [αmin, 1], βi ∈ [βmin, βmax], γi ∈ [γmin, 1] with αmin,
βmin, γmin > 0 and βmax < +∞.
(iii) We assume spanned endowments, i.e., wi ∈ X for all i.
Assumption 4.2 (iii) is not crucial, but added for sake of simplicity. Under these assumptions,
we can prove the following result about existence:
Theorem 4.3 (Existence of equilibria). Under Assumption 2.1, on a financial market with a
continuum of agents satisfying Assumptions 3.3 (positive final wealth) and 4.2, a market equi-
librium exists, i.e., there is a price vector q ∈ RJ+1+ and a portfolio allocation θˆ : [0, 1] → RJ+1
such that for almost every i ∈ [0, 1] the portfolio θˆi maximizes V i with respect to the budget set
{θi ∈ RJ+1 | ∑Jj=0 qj θij ≤∑Jj=0 qj θi0j} and ∫ 10 θi0j di = ∫ 10 θˆij di for all j = 0, . . . , J .
Proof of Theorem 4.3:
To prove Theorem 4.3, we need to show that the CPT-preferences as specified in Equation (1)
and Assumptions 2.2 and 4.2 imply the following three conditions for almost every i ∈ I:
16
(i) If θj ≥ θ˜j for all j = 0, . . . , J and θj > θ˜j for at least one j then V i(Xθ) > V i(Xθ˜), i.e., all
assets are desirable.
(ii) For each θ˜ ∈ RJ+1, the sets {θ ∈ RJ+1 | V i(Xθ) > V i(Xθ˜)} and {θ ∈ RJ+1 | V i(Xθ) <
V i(Xθ˜)} are open relative to RJ+1.
(iii) For all θ, θ˜ ∈ RJ+1, the set {i ∈ [0, 1] | V i(Xθ) > V i(Xθ˜)} is measurable.
The first property is a monotonicity requirement on the preference relation which follows directly
from Lemma 2.1 (i). The second property is a continuity condition which follows from Corol-
lary 2.1. The third assumption is a measurability condition: it follows from Assumption 4.2(ii):
first, V i is continuous in α, β and γ, since α, β and γ are uniformly positive by assumption.
Second, we recall that a level set of a piecewise continuous function with finitely many jumps in
[0, 1] is a finite union of intervals and therefore measurable.
Assumption 3.3 implies that the consumption set is bounded. Using Properties (i)-(iii) listed
above, we can prove our existence result by applying the classical result by Aumann (1966, Page 4)
and its generalization to standard bounded consumption sets presented by Hildenbrand (1974),
since all conditions for this result are satisfied. Note that we do not need market completeness as
we can apply Aumann’s proof to the non-negative part of the marketed subspace, a closed, convex
set that is bounded from below. This is because using the idea of no arbitrage, i.e., the existence
of positive state prices m ∈ RS+ and using the spanning Assumption 4.2(iii), we can rewrite the
portfolio choice Problem (7) as maxX∈X ,X≥0 V i(X), such that
∑S
s=1msXs ≤
∑S
s=1ms Y
i
s where
Y is =
∑J
j=0 Aj,s θ
i
0j . 2
Let us now take a look at ordinary prospect theory as introduced in Kahneman and Tversky
(1979); see Equation (6) and Assumption 2.4. Does our existence result carry over to this decision
model? Unfortunately, in this case, we cannot apply the existence theorem of Aumann (1966).
Indeed, the continuity condition in Corollary 2.1 is generally violated by prospect theory. To
make this precise, consider the following simple example that does not even rely on the convexity
of the value function for outcomes below the reference point:
Example 4.1. Let S = 2, J = 2 and p1 = p2 = 1/2. Let  > 0 and define the payoffs of the two
risky assets as follows:
A0 ≡ 1, A1,1 = A2,2 = 1 + , A1,2 = A2,1 = 1− .
The market is complete. The no-arbitrage condition implies
1−  < qj
q0
< 1 +  for j = 1, 2
where qj is the price of asset j, j = 0, 1, 2.
Let δi ∈ [0, 1] and define the reference point RP i = R0 (1− δi) for all agents i ∈ I.
In order to ensure that all assets only deliver gains with respect to the reference points RP i, we
need to have Rj > RP i for all i ∈ I and j = 0, 1, 2. This assumption will play an important role
in our example with only two states of nature. Indeed, as discusses in Section 2, with two states
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of nature, when portfolios deliver both gains and losses with strictly positive probability, prospect
theory coincides with cumulative prospect theory and our existence result from Theorem 4.3 ap-
plies. Using the no-arbitrage conditions from Equations (9) and (10) we can easily see that all
portfolios only deliver gains when
δi >
2 
1−  for all i ∈ I.
We have:
V¯ i(R0) = vi(δ R0)
and
V¯ i(λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2) = vi(δ R0) 2pii,+(1/2) +O().
Therefore, for  > 0 but small enough, the risk-free asset is superior to any risky portfolio, since
2pii,+(1/2) < 1 for all i, when the weighting functions pii,+ are given by Equation (5). This shows
that the PT-value function has a jump, thus the continuity condition in Corollary 2.1 is violated.
In our example, violation of the continuity condition implies non-existence of equilibria. In
the market considered, the risk-free return can be obtained in two ways. First, by holding the
risk-free asset, i.e., λ0 = 1, λ1 = λ2 = 0. Second, by holding a convex combination of the risk-free
asset and the portfolio (1/2) (0, q1/q0, q2/q0).9 Note that (1/2)(q1/q0) + (1/2) (q2/q0) = 1 since a
portfolio with half units of both risky assets delivers the risk-free payoff and thus the no-arbitrage
condition implies (1/2) q1 + (1/2) q2 = q0. Therefore, at any equilibrium (if it exists), the demand
for risky assets for trader i must satisfy :∫
i∈I θ
i
1 di∫
i∈I θ
i
2 di
=
(q1/q0) q2
(q2/q0) q1
= 1.
So, no market equilibrium can exist if the initial supply of risky assets satisfies∫
i∈I θ¯
i
0,1 di∫
i∈I θ¯
i
0,2 di
> 1.
We want to stress that the (potential) heterogeneity in the agents that we admit in this
example is not at all crucial for the proof: all δi and all vi could be equal and the non-existence
result would still hold.
The fundamental advantage of cumulative prospect theory compared to prospect theory is its
continuity with respect to weak-? convergence of the probability measure, as shown in Lemma 2.1.
The original form of prospect theory lacks this continuity property as can be seen, e.g., by the
event-splitting effect: when one outcome with a given probability is split into several similar
outcomes, each with smaller probability, the prospect theory utility usually increases due to the
over-weighting of small probabilities. In other words, if we let these outcomes converge to the
original outcome, the corresponding probability measure will converge, but the prospect theory
utility will not, leading to a violation of the continuity property.
9It is clear that asset 0 is redundant. We assumed that it exits in the market to simplify our discussion. When
asset 0 does not exist, the risk-free payoff can be obtained by combining the two risky assets, as discussed above.
This does not change the agents’ demand for risky assets, given that the risk-free payoff is optimal. Therefore, at
equilibrium, the demand for risky assets will satisfy the condition below even if asset 0 does not exist.
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5 Conclusion
Asset pricing models in finance usually assume that financial market equilibria exist and can
be described by a representative agent whose preferences are constructed based on the assumed
equilibrium. However, the existence of financial market equilibria is not guaranteed under popular
assumptions on investors’ preferences like prospect theory.
This paper addresses the existence of financial market equilibria when agents possess cumu-
lative prospect theory preferences. We introduce a general equilibrium model and we show that
financial market equilibria might not exist when there is a finite number of (heterogenous) agents.
This is due to two main implications of CPT preferences on aggregate assets’ demand. First,
the infinite short-selling problem arises when final wealth is not constrained to be positive and
agents possess piecewise-power value functions. The infinite short-selling problem causes assets’
demand to diverge to infinity and no market clearing prices exist when assets’ supply is finite.
Second, the convex-concave shape of the value function of CPT preferences causes discontinuities
in the aggregate assets’ demand so that market clearing prices might not exist, even if agents
possess homogeneous preferences. This is in contrast to portfolio optimization problems where
probability weighting can mitigate the effects of the value function (Jin and Zhou 2008). We then
show that financial market equilibria exist if there is a continuum of agents with CPT preferences
and non-negativity constraints on final wealth hold. The latter assumption solves the infinite
short-selling problem, while the the former establishes the continuity of the demand function.
The existence of financial market equilibria is an essential property for any general equilibrium
model. The assumption of many finance models that equilibrium prices can be described by a
representative agent obviously requires the condition that a financial market equilibrium exists.
This paper shows that with CPT preferences this is usually not the case unless one considers a
continuum of investors. The probability weighting is not just an additional technical difficulty, but
plays a crucial role: the existence in the case of a continuum of investors can be established in the
CPT model, but not necessarily in the classical PT (prospect theory) framework where a different
discontinuity due to probability weighting arises. The results contribute to a deeper understanding
of the asset pricing implications of the most important descriptive model of decision.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
(i) It is well-known that cumulative prospect theory satisfies first order stochastic dominance
(see, for example Levy 2006, Chapters 14 and 15). When X,Y ∈ X satisfies X ≥ Y , then
X dominates Y by first order stochastic dominance. Then also X + wi dominates Y + wi
by first order stochastic dominance and thus V i(X) ≥ V i(Y ). When a state s exists such
that X(s) > Y (s) then first order stochastic domaninance of X over Y is strict. Under
Assumption 2.2 (i) (vi is stricly increasing) we have V i(X) > V i(Y ).
(ii) Since pn weakly-? converges to p, we have Fn(x) → F (x) for almost every x ∈ R and
| limn→∞ Fn(x)−F (x)| ≤ 1 for all x ∈ R. Moreover, under Assumption 2.2, both (pii,+)′ and
(pii,−)′ are continuous, thus the same convergence holds for (pii,+)′(1− Fn) and (pii,−)′(Fn).
We rewrite V i as follows:
V i(X) =
=
∫ RP i
−∞
vi(x−RP i) d
dy
(
(pii,−)(Fn(y))
) |y=x dx
−
∫ ∞
RP i
vi(x−RP i) d
dy
(
(pii,+)(1− Fn(y))
) |y=x dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
min{vi(x−RP i), 0} d
dy
(
(pii,−)(Fn(y))
) |y=x dx
−
∫ ∞
∞
max{vi(x−RP i), 0} d
dy
(
(pii,+)(1− Fn(y))
) |y=x dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
min{vi(x−RP i), 0} (pii,−)′(Fn(x)) dpn
−
∫ ∞
∞
max{vi(x−RP i), 0} (pii,+)′(1− Fn(x)) dpn.
The product of a weakly-? converging term and an a.e. converging bounded term, is weak-
? convergent. Since the support of the pn is uniformly bounded, we can replace vi by a
bounded, continuous function without changing the last two integrals. The last expression
therefore converges to∫ ∞
−∞
min{vi(x−RP i), 0} (pii,−)′(Fn(x)) dp
−
∫ ∞
∞
max{vi(x−RP i), 0} (pii,+)′(1− Fn(x)) dp
= V i(X).
This proves that V i(Xn)→ V i(X).
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A.2 Proof of Corollary 2.1
It is sufficient to prove that the CPT-utility V i as function θ is continuous, since pre-images
of open sets are open when the function is continuous. The payoff distribution of a portfolio
allocation θ can be described by the probability measure
pθ =
S∑
s=1
psδ∑J
j=0 θj Aj,s
where δ denotes a Dirac measure.
This probability measure pθ is weak-? continuous in the variable θ, i.e., whenever θn → θ, we
have ∫
R
f(x)dpθn(x)→
∫
R
f(x)dpθ(x)
for all bounded continuous functions f . This follows essentially from the fact that δxn converges
weak-? to δx whenever xn → x.
On the other hand, the CPT-utility is weak-? continuous on probability measures as shown
in Lemma 2.1 (ii).
We can thus combine the continuous dependence of the probability measure from the asset
allocation on the one hand, and the weak-? continuity of the CPT-utility on the other hand, to
see that the CPT-utility depends continuously on the portfolio allocation θ, i.e., θ 7→ V i(Xθ) is
continuous. This proves the corollary.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Follows directly from the equation for optimal strategies λi,opt0 .
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2
In order to simplify the notation we drop the index i. The proof is structured as follows:
(i) We show that the optimal portfolio choices λopt0 are an element of {λmin0 , λ∗0, λmax0 }.
(ii) We prove that the equation V˜ (λ∗0) = V˜ (λmin0 ) possesses a solution ξ = ωu(R0) for any
R0 > 0 fixed, and we show that ωu(R0) is bounded from below by ωu.
(iii) We show that ωu(R0) is unique.
(iv) We show that limR0→0 ωu(R0) =∞ and limR0→∞ ωu(R0) = ωu.
(v) Steps (ii)-(iv) are similar for ωd(R0).
Keep in mind that the assumptions α ∈ (0, 1) and w1 + w2 > 0 hold.
(i) We show that the optimal portfolio choices λopt0 are elements of {λmin0 , λ∗0, λmax0 }.
For all ξ ∈ R and R0 > 0 fixed, the following holds. First, the function V˜ (λ0) is strictly
convex on [λu0 , λ
max
0 ], thus V˜ (λ0) < max{V˜ (λmax0 ), V˜ (λu0)} for all λ0 ∈ (λu0 , λmax0 ). Second,
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the function V˜ (λ0) is strictly convex on [λmin0 , λ
d
0], thus V˜ (λ0) < max{V˜ (λmin0 ), V˜ (λd0)} for
all λ0 ∈ (λmin0 , λd0). Finally, the function V˜ (λ0) is strictly concave on (λd0, λu0). We solve the
first condition V˜ ′(λ0) = 0 on (λd0, λu0) to find the maximum and we obtain:
pi1
pi2
(
R1(1)−R0
R0 −R1(2)
)
=
(
(1− λ0) (R1(2)−R0)w0 + w2
(1− λ0) (R1(1)−R0)w0 + w1
)α−1
⇔ η(ξ) =
(
pi1 e
ξ
pi2
) 1
α−1
=
(1− λ0) (R1(2)−R0)w0 + w2
(1− λ0) (R1(1)−R0)w0 + w1
⇔ λ∗0 = 1−
1
R0
w2 − η(ξ)w1
w0 (η(ξ) + e−ξ)
1 + ζ eξ
eξ (1− ζ) .
One can easily show that λ∗0 ∈ (λd0, λu0), and V (λ∗0) > max{V˜ (λu0), V˜ (λd0)}. This proves the
first statement.
(ii) We prove that the equation V˜ (λ∗0) = V˜ (λmin0 ) possesses a solution ξ = ωu(R0) for any
R0 > 0 fixed, and we show that ωu(R0) is bounded from below by ωu.
Let x = eξ > 0 and p˜i =
(
pi1
pi2
) 1
α−1 , then η(ξ) = p˜i x
1
α−1 and
V˜ (λmin0 ) = pi1 ((w2 + w0R0)x+ w1)
α − pi2 β (R0w0)α ,
V˜ (λ∗0) =
(
w2 x+ w1
p˜i x
α
α−1 + 1
)α (
pi1 + pi2 p˜iα x
α
α−1
)
= pi1 (w2 x+ w1)α
(
1 + p˜i x
α
α−1
)1−α
V˜ (λd0) = pi1 (w2 x+ w1)
α .
It follows that:
lim
x→∞ V˜ (λ
min
0 )− V˜ (λ∗0) = ∞
lim
x→0
V˜ (λmin0 )− V˜ (λ∗0) < −pi2 β (R0w0)α < 0.
Since the difference V˜ (λmin0 )− V˜ (λ∗0) is a continuous function of x, there exist xu(R0) > 0
such that V˜ (λmin0 )−V˜ (λ∗0) = 0, or, equivalently V˜ (λmin0 ) = V˜ (λ∗0). This proves the existence
of ωu(R0) = lnxu(R0) for any R0 > 0.
For any ξ ≤ 1α ln
(
pi2 β
pi1
)
= ωu fixed, V˜ (λmin0 ) is a strictly decreasing function of R0. For any
ξ > ωu fixed, V˜ (λmin0 ) is a strictly decreasing function of R0 on (0, R
min
0 (ξ)) and a strictly
increasing function of R0 on (Rmin0 (ξ),∞), where
Rmin0 (ξ) =
w2 e
ξ + w1
w0
((
pi1 eξ
pi2 β
) 1
1−α − eξ
) .
Thus, for ξ ≤ ωu, V˜ (λmin0 ) < V˜ (λd0) < V˜ (λ∗0) for any R0 > 0. Consequently, ωu(R0) ≥ ωu
for R0 > 0. This completes the proof of the second statement.
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(iii) We show that ωu(R0) is unique.
As in (ii), we consider V˜ (λmin0 ) and V˜ (λ
∗
0) as functions of x > 0 for R0 > 0 fixed.
Suppose that there exist x1 6= x2 such that V˜ (λmin0 ) = V˜ (λ∗0). Then, since V˜ (λmin0 ) > V˜ (λ∗0)
for any x large enough, and V˜ (λmin0 ) < V˜ (λ
∗
0) for any x small enough, at least at one of
the crossing points of the two functions, the slope of V˜ (λ∗0) is larger or equal to the slope of
V˜ (λmin0 ); see Figure 5.
[Figure 5 about here.]
We compute the partial derivatives of V˜ (λmin0 ) and V˜ (λ
∗
0) with respect to x:
∂
∂x
V˜ (λmin0 ) = pi1 α ((w2 + w0R0)x+ w1)
α−1 (w2 + w0R0)
= α (w2 + w0R0)
(
V˜ (λmin0 ) + pi2 β (R0w0)
α
)
((w2 + w0R0)x+ w1)−1,
∂
∂x
V˜ (λ∗0) = pi1 α (w2 x+ w1)
α−1
(
1 + p˜i x
α
α−1
)−α (
w2 − w1 p˜i x
1
α−1
)
= α V˜ (λ∗0)(w2 x+ w1)
−1
(
1 + p˜i x
α
α−1
)−1 (
w2 − w1 p˜i x
1
α−1
)
Let x > 0 be such that V˜ (λmin0 ) = V˜ (λ
∗
0). Without loss of generality, we assume that
∂
∂x V˜ (λ
∗
0)
∣∣∣
x
> 0. Since V˜ (λmin0 ) is strictly increasing in x, if
∂
∂x V˜ (λ
∗
0)
∣∣∣
x
< 0 then the slope of
V˜ (λ∗0) is obviously smaller than the slope of V˜ (λmin0 ) in x. Then
w2 − w1 p˜i x
1
α−1 > 0
and thus w2 > 0. Moreover,
∂
∂x
V˜ (λ∗0) ≥
∂
∂x
V˜ (λmin0 )
⇔ V˜ (λ∗0)
(w2 + w0R0)x+ w1
(w2 x+ w1) (w2 + w0R0)
w2 − w1 p˜i x
1
α−1
1 + p˜i x
α
α−1
≥ V˜ (λ∗0) + pi2 β (R0w0)α.
However,
(w2 + w0R0)x+ w1
(w2 x+ w1) (w2 + w0R0)
<
1
w2
and
w2 − w1 p˜i x
1
α−1
1 + p˜i x
α
α−1
< w2
and therefore
V˜ (λ∗0)
(w2 + w0R0)x+ w1
(w2 x+ w1) (w2 + w0R0)
w2 − w1 p˜i x
1
α−1
1 + p˜i x
α
α−1
< V˜ (λ∗0) < V˜ (λ
∗
0) + pi2 β (R0w0)
α
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which contradicts the assumption that ∂∂x V˜ (λ
∗
0) ≥ ∂∂x V˜ (λmin0 ) at some crossing point.
This proves the statement that the crossing point is unique. Uniqueness of the crossing
point ωu(R0) also implies that for prices ξ > ωu(R0) the strategy λmin0 is preferred to the
strategy λ∗0.
(iv) We show that limR0→0 ωu(R0) =∞ and limR0→∞ ωu(R0) = ωu.
The property that limR0→0 ωu(R0) =∞ follows directly point (ii), since for R0 = 0 and any
ξ ∈ R0 we have V˜ (λmin0 ) = V˜ (λd0) and V˜ (λ∗0) > V˜ (λd0).
The property that limR0→∞ ωu(R0) = ωu follows directly from limR0→∞ V˜ (λmin0 ) = ∞ for
all ξ > ωu and from the uniqueness of ωu(R0) for all R0 > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We first summarize the following results from the proof of Lemma 3.2: Let αi ∈ (0, 1) and
wi1 + w
i
2 > 0. Then:
(1) For any ξ < ωiu fixed, V˜
i(λi,min0 ) is a strictly decreasing function of R0;
(2) For any ξ > ωiu fixed, V˜
i(λi,min0 ) is a strictly decreasing function of R0 on (0, R
i,min
0 (ξ)) and
a strictly increasing function of R0 on (R
i,min
0 (ξ),∞), where
Ri,min0 (ξ) =
wi2 e
ξ + wi1
wi0
((
pii1 e
ξ
pii2 β
i
) 1
1−αi − eξ
) .
Since agents’ preferences are identical, w11 = w
2
1 > 0 and w
1
2 = w
2
2 = 0 for all i, then ω
1
k(R0) =
ω2k(R0) = ωk(R0) for k ∈ {d, u}. From Lemma 3.2 we derive the demand for the risk-free asset as
function of ξ; we have:
(-7)

λ1,max0 + λ
2,max
0 if ξ < ω
i
d(R0)
λ1,opt0 + λ
2,opt
0 , λ
i,opt
0 ∈ {λi,max0 , λi,∗0 } if ξ = ωid(R0)
λ1,∗0 + λ
2,∗
0 if ξ ∈ (ωid(R0), ωiu(R0))
λ1,opt0 + λ
2,opt
0 , λ
i,opt
0 ∈ {λi,min0 , λi,∗0 } if ξ = ωiu(R0)
λ1,min0 + λ
2,min
0 if ξ > ω
i
u(R0).
From the definitions of λi,min0 , λ
i,max
0 , λ
i,?
0 and using w
1
2 = w
2
2 = 0 it is clear that
λ1,max0 + λ
2,max
0 ≥ 2
λi,max0 + λ
j,∗
0 ≥ 2 for i 6= j
λ1,∗0 + λ
2,∗
0 ≥ 2
λ1,min0 + λ
2,min
0 < 0.
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Therefore, the market clearing condition is not verified for any ξ 6= ωu(R0), and for ξ = ωu(R0)
we must have λi,opt0 = λ
i,∗
0 and λ
j,opt
0 = λ
j,min
0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (without loss of generality, we
assume i = 1 and j = 2).
Remember that for R0 > 0, the price ωu(R0) is the point where V˜ i(λ
i,min
0 ) and V˜
i(λi,∗0 )
cross, thus agent i is indifferent between λi,min0 and λ
i,∗
0 . From the market clearing condition
λ1,∗0 + λ
2,min
0 = 1 we have that at equilibrium
R0(ξ) =
η1(ξ)w1
w0 (η1(ξ) + e−ξ)
1 + ζ eξ
eξ ζ (1 + eξ)
.
We prove that the following system of equations do not posses any solution{
R0 = R0(ξ)
ξ = ωu(R0).
If this is true, then the market clearing condition is never satisfied for any price (ξ,R0), when
agents optimally allocate their resources.
The function R0(ξ) is strictly decreasing and limξ→∞R0(ξ) = 0, limξ→∞R0(ξ) = ∞. More-
over, since β ≥ 1 and ζ < 1, we have R0(ξ) < Ropt0 (ξ). Moreover, for any ξ and R0 = 0 we
have V (λi,d0 ) = V˜
i(λi,min0 ). Finally, since from Lemma 3.2 we know that ω
i
u(R0) > ω
i
u, then
V˜ i(λi,min0 ) < V˜
i(λi,d0 ) for any R0(ξ). Since V˜
i(λi,d0 ) < V˜
i(λi,∗0 ), then V˜
i(λi,min0 ) and V˜
i(λi,∗0 ) never
cross for any R0(ξ) that satisfies the market clearing condition. Consequently, agents 1 and 2 can-
not be indifferent between λi,min0 and λ
i,∗
0 and since they possess identical preferences, λ
i,opt
0 = λ
i,∗
0
and λj,opt0 = λ
j,min
0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j cannot be an equilibrium. This proves the proposition.
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Agent 1 2
αi 0.88 1
βi 2.25 1
γi 0.61 1
ωid -4.11 -4.60
ωiu -2.26 -4.60
Table 1: Parameter specification for the two agents of Example 3.1. The lower and upper bounds
ωiu and ω
i
d for both agents are also reported.
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Agent 1 2
αi 0.88 0.88
βi 2.25 2.20
γi 0.61 0.61
wi0 1 1
wi1 2 1
wi2 0 0
Table 2: Parameter specification for the two investors of Example 3.2.
29
R0
ω
(R
0)
0 1 2 3 4 5
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Figure 1: The figure shows the functions ωd(R0) (full line) and ωu(R0) (dashed line) for an agent
with α = 0.88, β = 2.25, γ = 0.61, and w0 = w1 = w2. The limits ωd and ωu are also plotted
(dotted lines).
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Figure 2: Optimal strategy λopt0 for a CPT agent, as function of the parameters α (top) and β
(bottom) of the piecewise-power value function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The prices ξ
and R0 are fixed and correspond to R0 = 1 and ξ = ωiu(R0) where it is assumed that the i-th
agent has α = 0.88 and β = 2.25. 31
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Figure 3: The figure shows the functions ωid(R0) and ω
i
u(R0) for agent 1 (full line) and agent 2
(dotted line), who only differ by their index of loss aversion and endowment at time t = 1. Agents’
preferences are specified in Table 2.
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Figure 4: The figure shows the functions ω1u(R0(ξ)) and ω
2
u(R0(ξ)) for agent 1 (full line) and agent
2 (dotted line), who only differ by their index of loss aversion and endowment at time t = 1. The
45◦ line is also plotted. The function R0(ξ) is the market clearing risk-free return for the price ξ.
Agents’ preferences are specified in Table 2.
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V(λ0*)
V(λ0min)
x
Figure 5: The figure shows hypothetical shapes for the CPT values of the strategies λ∗0 and λmin0 ,
as function of the price x = eξ. The crossing points correspond to the prices where the agent
is indifferent between λ∗0 and λmin0 . The figure visualizes the argument that if more than one
crossing points x1 and x2 exists, then for at least one those points the slope of the CPT value of
λ∗0 as function of x, is larger than the slope of the CPT value of λmin0 as function of x.
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